Ontario Court of Appeal Interprets the Crime of Intimidation – How This Is Relevant to Anti-Israel Protest Activities
Introduction
In training ALCCA provides to police and prosecutors across the country, we emphasize the availability of numerous underutilized criminal law tools to address unlawful activity, particularly on our streets.
One of those key tools is the offence of intimidation that specifically addresses the blocking or obstructing of highways (which include all roads to which the public has the right of access).¹ We explain to law enforcement that this offence does not require proof of threatened violence, although such threatened violence may also trigger the use of other subsections of this offence.
In a recent decision, a unanimous panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal validated our interpretation of the offence. In doing so, it also provided important guidance on the distinction between lawful and unlawful protests.
The Facts
Patrick King was a key organizer and leader of the Freedom Convoy, using his large online following to direct strategy, encourage unlawful blockades, promote horn-blasting, and coordinate actions that significantly disrupted Ottawa’s residents, infrastructure, and emergency services, even after injunctions were issued.
On November 22, 2024, he was convicted of several criminal offences, including counselling mischief, mischief, counselling others to obstruct police, counselling others to disobey a court order and disobeying a court order. After awarding pre-sentence credit for the equivalent of nine months in custody, the trial judge imposed a three-month conditional sentence (house arrest), followed by one year of probation.
The prosecution appealed the sentence. The prosecution also appealed King’s acquittal on a charge of intimidation by blocking or obstructing a highway, contrary to s. 423(1)(g) of the Criminal Code.
The Court of Appeal’s Decision
On Friday, July 17, 2026, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned Patrick King’s acquittal on this charge. It held that the trial judge committed three major legal errors.
1. Treating Political Protest as a Defence to Wrongfulness
The trial judge erred in concluding that Mr. King did not act “wrongfully and without lawful authority” because the events took place as part of a political protest. The Court of Appeal confirmed that “mass obstruction of public highways is not a form of peaceful protest. The fundamental freedoms of expression and assembly do not encompass obstructing public highways or inciting anyone else to do so.” Simply stated, “criminal conduct is not less criminal because it occurs during a lawful protest.”
King’s conduct was designed to, and had the effect of, interfering with and obstructing the use and enjoyment of property of downtown residents and workers,” satisfying the requirement that he acted “wrongfully and without lawful authority.”
2. Requiring Proof of Threats or Violence
The trial judge erred in concluding that intimidation under s. 423(1)(g) requires threats or acts of violence when highways are obstructed during otherwise lawful demonstrations. The Court of Appeal confirmed that blocking or obstructing a highway is one method of intimidation. It does not require proof of violence or threats of violence, although those also represent other methods of intimidation. Nor is a specific intent to intimidate required. Blocking or obstructing a highway is an inherently intimidating act.
3. Finding the Government Is Not a “Person”
The trial judge erred in holding that the Government of Canada is not a “person” under s. 423(1). Subsection 423(1) requires proof that the prohibited activity was done “to compel another person to abstain from doing something that he or she has the lawful right to do or to do anything that he or she has a lawful right to abstain from doing.” The government is a “person”, in law, and the accused’s conduct was aimed at compelling the government to change its COVID-19 policies.
Guidance on Sentencing
The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction on the charge of intimidation. On the trial judge’s own findings, King was guilty of this offence. Because the conviction on the intimidation charge changed the global sentencing picture, the Court remitted the sentencing hearing back to a new judge of the Superior Court.
However, the Court provided additional guidance: The trial judge was concerned that too harsh a sentence could have a chilling effect on legitimate political expression. The Court emphasized that King’s conduct far exceeded the bounds of legitimate political expression. The protest did not “grow out of control” – it was planned as an occupation from the outset. It was a coordinated, targeted attack on Ottawa residents “aimed at coercing change through highly disruptive criminal conduct.”
Properly characterized, it was an attack on the rule of law, and the democratic principles essential to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. The Court did not prescribe a sentence but clearly indicated that a fit sentence “must reflect a full appreciation of the public impact of the offences, as well as the scope, duration and persistence of Mr. King’s actions”.
Conclusion
This is an important case with significant implications for future protest, demonstration and occupation activity, including the all-too-frequent anti-Israel or pro-Hamas rallies we are experiencing in Canada that block or obstruct roads and intersections. The case draws a clear bright line between legitimate protest activity and criminal conduct. It confirms that characterizing conduct as a “protest” will not immunize it from criminal liability where it crosses the line into criminal conduct.
The blocking or obstruction of a highway in an attempt to compel an outcome (whether or not that outcome is the subject of legitimate protest activity) is inherently wrongful, intimidating and criminal. This signals a strong judicial intolerance for protest tactics that involve coercive disruption of public infrastructure.
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Endnotes
1.This does not refer to the new, additional offence of intimidation, created by Bill C-9. See s. 423.3(1).
About the Author
Rochelle Direnfeld is ALCCA’s Senior Criminal Counsel. She was called to the Ontario bar in 1990 and has served in the Ontario Public Service for over 32 years as an assistant crown attorney, deputy crown attorney, crown counsel, and finally as Deputy Director for Toronto Crown Attorneys in the Criminal Law Division of the Ministry of the Attorney General. Rochelle retired from public service at the end of 2023. During her career, she prosecuted a wide variety of Criminal Code cases in the Ontario Court of Justice, Superior Court of Justice, and the Ontario Court of Appeal.
Rochelle is also the Chair of the Canadian Criminal Law Working Group, a national initiative bringing together leading criminal lawyers to strengthen the legal response to antisemitic hate crimes and support victims across Canada.
She has also been selected to join the Toronto Police Service Board’s Jewish Community Advisory Table, an initiative aimed at strengthening dialogue and collaboration between the Jewish community and the Toronto Police Service on issues of community safety and policing.