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Antisemitism in the UK Legal Profession: Disciplinary Cases and Lessons for Canada

Writer: Mark Sandler
Mark Sandler
3 hours ago
9 min read
Royal Courts of Justice, London, England. Source: Slow Travel UK
Royal Courts of Justice, London, England.

Recent disciplinary decisions in the United Kingdom have examined the responsibilities of legal professionals whose public statements cross the line from legitimate political expression into antisemitism and other forms of discriminatory conduct. These cases offer important insights into how professional regulators and courts assess such conduct, the role of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, and the implications for professional accountability in Canada.


British Barrister Suspended for Four Months Over Antisemitic LinkedIn Posts Invoking the “Final Solution”


A disciplinary tribunal in England has imposed a four-month suspension on barrister Forz Khan after finding that five posts he published on LinkedIn in March and April 2025 were antisemitic and/or seriously offensive.


The decision, issued on November 10, 2026, followed a hearing before a three-member disciplinary tribunal of the Bar Tribunal and Adjudication Service. Khan was found guilty of two charges of professional misconduct under Core Duty 5 of the Bar Standards Board’s Handbook. That duty requires barristers to behave in a way that does not diminish the trust and confidence that the public places in them or in the profession.


Khan was called to the Bar in July 1988 and is self-employed. 


In March 2025, Khan wrote that there was “only one solution to the evil that is zionism” and called for a “complete global cleansing” of what he described as a pernicious cult.


In another post, he wrote: “There is only 1 final solution to that problem that is Israel.” The reference to a “final solution” is particularly disturbing given its unmistakable historical association with the Nazi regime’s plan to exterminate European Jewry.


A further post declared that “the world needs to eradicate zios globally.” "Zios" is a highly pejorative term used to target Zionists. 


An April 2025 post stated: “Scum like this should be in a gas chamber.” Another again invoked a “final solution” to the problem of Israel.


The Bar Standards Board concluded that individually or collectively and viewed in their context, the posts were antisemitic and/or seriously offensive. The tribunal found that Khan’s conduct was likely to undermine public confidence in both him and the legal profession.


The penalty and appeal


The tribunal ordered Khan to be suspended from practice for four months and to pay £2,880 in costs to the Bar Standards Board.


The tribunal has not yet published its full reasons. We will provide a link to them when available. The suspension only takes effect following the expiry of the appeal period if no appeal is brought. 


A wider issue of professional accountability


The case comes amid a substantial increase in complaints in the United Kingdom concerning barristers’ use of social media. In its 2025–26 Annual Report, the Bar Standards Board disclosed that it assessed 279 cases relating to social media conduct, more than double the 132 cases assessed in the previous year. Of these, 192 concerned the Israel-Palestine conflict.


Other recent disciplinary proceedings involving solicitors¹ illustrate the range of sanctions imposed in cases involving antisemitic expression.


In May 2026, solicitor Jonathan Lea received a 12-month suspension, suspended for two years, after the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal found that he had published antisemitic and other offensive material. The tribunal concluded that his motivation was attention-seeking rather than antisemitism, and considered his subsequent insight and remediation in determining the sanction.


In August 2025, solicitor Mohammed Sarfraz received a six-month suspension, itself suspended for one year, following findings concerning antisemitic and seriously offensive social media posts. The tribunal distinguished between legitimate political criticism of Israel and expression that crossed the boundaries of professional conduct.


Husain Case: High Court Upholds Disbarment for Antisemitism


In the most serious case, the High Court of England and Wales upheld a disciplinary tribunal's decision to strike off solicitor Farrukh Najeeb Husain from the Roll of Solicitors in May 2025. Mr. Justice Chamberlain described Husain’s tweets as demonstrating “unvarnished antisemitic racism” and concluded that the tribunal was entitled to find that his statements, viewed collectively, were founded on hatred or hostility towards Jews.


The decision is particularly important because it addresses a recurring legal and evidentiary problem: how to distinguish legitimate criticism of Israel from antisemitism, including situations in which the word Zionist is used as a substitute for Jew.


The misconduct


Husain operated a public Twitter account on which he identified himself as a lawyer and, in several posts, specifically as an employment solicitor.

The disciplinary proceedings involved three allegations:


  • Antisemitic, inappropriate and/or offensive tweets

  • Other inappropriate and/or offensive tweets

  • Offensive and inappropriate emails to the regulator


Husain admitted writing the tweets but argued that he was expressing political opinions in a personal capacity and that his comments were not antisemitic.


The nature of the antisemitic conduct


The High Court identified several distinct forms of antisemitism in the tweets.


A. Using ‘Zionist’ as a substitute for ‘Jew’


Husain repeatedly directed abuse at three Jewish journalists, describing them as Zionists and attacking them in connection with their Jewish ancestry and perceived support for Israel. At paragraph 120, the judge concluded that, in context, the word Zionist was being used as a code word or placeholder for Jew.


He also found that the tweets reflected two established antisemitic themes:


  • The conspiracy theory that Jews control the media.

  • The allegation that Jewish citizens are more loyal to Israel than to their own country.


B. Racialising the Jewish population of Israel


Husain repeatedly described Israelis as Eastern European immigrants and told them to return to Poland or Hungary.


His argument about the displacement of Palestinians during Israel’s establishment was, in principle, within legitimate political debate. However, the judge found that Husain had chosen to advance that argument through racially charged language, repeatedly portraying Jews as foreign interlopers who had no legitimate connection to the land.


Justice Chamberlain held that these comments were antisemitic because they racialised the political argument by singling out the European origins of some Jews while disregarding the diverse origins of the Jewish population of Israel.


C. Dehumanisation and historically antisemitic slurs


Husain referred to his Jewish interlocutor as a "Zionist PIG."


The judge regarded this as racialised abuse. He noted that the term pig has historically been used to dehumanise Jews and that the tribunal was entitled to infer that it had been selected with that significance in mind.


D. Nazi terminology and Holocaust-related imagery


One of the tweets compared Israeli conduct to Nazi Germany using the German terms Untermenschen (subhumans) and Lebensraum (living space). The IHRA definition of antisemitism includes, as an illustrative example, “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.” Such comparisons are apt to be incendiary and likely to be especially hurtful.


However, the judge correctly noted that IHRA does not claim that every comparison between Israel and Nazi Germany is ipso facto antisemitic. It makes the more modest claim that such comparisons could, depending on the context, be antisemitic.


Nonetheless, the judge observed that “the language or imagery of Nazism is often used as a taunt, which deliberately references and weaponizes the most painful events in Jewish history… Depending on the context, a criticism of Israel which pointedly uses Nazi language and imagery as a racialized taunt of this kind could reasonably be regarded as antisemitic.”


He found that Husain’s tweet was not a reasoned historical comparison. It had to be understood in the context of the surrounding tweets and was properly found to be antisemitic.


E. The stereotype of Jewish financial greed


In another tweet, Husain wrote that Zionists always wanted to take people’s money. The judge concluded that the reference to taking money invoked the longstanding antisemitic stereotype that Jews are greedy or obsessed with money. He explained that this stereotype had historical roots in restrictions that prevented Jews in parts of Europe from entering professions other than banking.


Justice Chamberlain’s treatment of the IHRA definition


Husain argued that the disciplinary tribunal had erred by relying on the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism. He characterized it as flawed and politically partisan, and argued that it improperly conflated anti-Zionism with antisemitism.


The judge rejected the proposition that reliance on IHRA was inherently improper. He observed that the definition was consistent with the definitions in major dictionaries and with an established understanding of antisemitism.


The judge correctly observed that the IHRA illustrative examples do not represent a list of statements that automatically constitute antisemitism. They are examples of conduct that could, depending on the circumstances and overall context, constitute antisemitism.


He said: “If properly understood … most of the IHRA’s examples are, in my view, both unobjectionable and useful.”


He explained that they illustrate historically recognized ways in which hatred or hostility towards Jews has been expressed.


The judge noted that particular care is required in applying the seventh and eighth illustrative examples: “denying the Jewish people the right of self-determination e.g. by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor” and “applying double standards by requiring of it a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.”


In his view, these examples relate to speech which is critical of the historic or contemporary conduct of the State of Israel. Such speech in principle attracts the highest level of protection. He therefore concluded that it is unlikely that the substantive content of speech alone that falls within these two examples will justify the label “antisemitic.” However, the speech may be antisemitic nonetheless, depending on the language used and context.


The significance of historical knowledge and coded language


The judge recognized that antisemitism is not always expressed openly. It frequently operates through coded language, images, historical references and conspiracy theories. He observed that an ordinary reasonable reader may not necessarily recognize the historical significance of an antisemitic image or expression.


He referred, by way of example, to historical depictions of Jews as controllers of finance and media, as well as images of octopuses, vampires and puppet-masters.


At paragraph 114, he formulated the appropriate approach: “The most natural way of addressing this is to ask whether the statement or conduct in question would be regarded as antisemitic to an observer with a reasonable understanding of the main historical and cultural manifestations of antisemitism.”


Subject to the caveats reflected in the judge's reasons, reference to the IHRA definition and examples may assist in making that determination.


The Tribunal’s Findings and the Court’s Decision


The disciplinary tribunal found three separate categories of professional misconduct:


  • Antisemitic and offensive tweets.

  • Other seriously offensive and discriminatory tweets, including racist and sexually degrading language directed at individuals.

  • Abusive communications to the regulator’s investigating officer.


The emails to the regulator included allegations that the investigating officer was a Zionist apologist and racist, together with gratuitous references to her Sikh Punjabi and Indian background.


The judge also considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

The aggravating circumstances included:


  • Deliberate and repeated misconduct over approximately nine months.

  • Antisemitic and racist language.

  • Bullying and personal abuse.

  • High and foreseeable harm to those targeted.

  • Damage to public confidence in the legal profession.

  • No meaningful insight into the misconduct.

  • No genuine contrition.


The judge upheld the tribunal's conclusion that no lesser sanction would adequately protect the public against repetition of the conduct. He dismissed the appeal and upheld the striking-off order.²

 

The Canadian context 


We must critically examine how professional regulators in Canada, including law societies, are addressing complaints of antisemitic conduct in the various professions.


I can say, with some confidence, based on the work of ALCCA and some of its member organizations, that the landscape, to say the least, is not a pretty one. A number of regulators have shown great reluctance to address contemporary antisemitism or have done so in ways that lack transparency or accountability.


I recognize, as did the High Court in the Husain case, that there are sometimes difficult lines to draw between protected political expression, which must be zealously safeguarded, and speech or conduct that is antisemitic or deeply offensive to a point that it undermines respect for the profession, and marginalizes or demonizes Jewish professionals.


The fact that there are sometimes difficult lines to draw is not a legitimate reason to immunize even the most extreme forms of antisemitic rhetoric from professional liability. However, that appears to be a too frequent occurrence in professional regulation. The levels of vitriol directed against Jews in some professions by their ostensible colleagues remain unacceptable.


We must call upon regulators to provide disaggregated data on complaints of antisemitism, how they were disposed of, and where disposed of informally, what messages regulators communicated to those whose conduct fell below acceptable standards.


If regulators caution members of their profession, the cautions have limited value if the regulator is not prepared to disclose to the profession as a whole and put its members on notice as to what conduct is unacceptable.


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Endnotes


1. The United Kingdom formally distinguishes between barristers and solicitors. There is no formal divided bar in Canada.


About the Author

Mark Sandler, LL.B., LL.D. (honoris causa), ALCCA’s Chair, is widely recognized as one of Canada’s leading criminal lawyers and pro bono advocates. He has been involved in combatting antisemitism for over 40 years. He has lectured extensively on legal remedies to combat hate and has promoted respectful Muslim-Jewish, Sikh-Jewish and Black-Jewish dialogues. He has appeared before Parliamentary committees and in the Supreme Court of Canada on multiple occasions on issues relating to antisemitism and hate activities. He is a former member of the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal, a three-time elected Bencher of the Law Society of Ontario, and recipient of the criminal profession’s highest honour, the G. Arthur Martin Medal, for his contributions to the administration of criminal justice. He is also the only non-policing member of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police’s Special Purpose Committee on Hate Crimes, serving as its legal expert.



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